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In experimental aesthetics the relationship between the arts and cognitive neuroscience
has gained particular interest in recent years. But has cognitive neuroscience indeed
something to offer when studying the arts? Here we present a theoretical frame
within which the concept of complementarity as a generative or creative principle is
proposed; neurocognitive processes are characterized by the duality of complementary
activities like bottom-up and top-down control, or logistical functions like temporal
control and content functions like perceptions in the neural machinery. On that basis
a thought pattern is suggested for aesthetic appreciations and cognitive appraisals
in general. This thought pattern is deeply rooted in the history of philosophy and art
theory since antiquity; and complementarity also characterizes neural operations as
basis for cognitive processes. We then discuss some challenges one is confronted
with in experimental aesthetics; in our opinion, one serious problem is the lack of a
taxonomy of functions in psychology and neuroscience which is generally accepted.
This deficit makes it next to impossible to develop acceptable models which are similar
to what has to be modeled. Another problem is the severe language bias in this field of
research as knowledge gained in many languages over the ages remains inaccessible
to most scientists. Thus, an inspection of research results or theoretical concepts is
necessarily too narrow. In spite of these limitations we provide a selective summary
of some results and viewpoints with a focus on visual art and its appreciation. It is
described how questions of art and aesthetic appreciations using behavioral methods
and in particular brain-imaging techniques are analyzed and evaluated focusing on such
issues like the representation of artwork or affective experiences. Finally, we emphasize
complementarity as a generative principle on a practical level when artists and scientists
work directly together which can lead to new insights and broader perspectives on both
sides.
Keywords: complementarity, visual art, neuroaesthetics, brain imaging, taxonomy of functions, modeling, thought
pattern, language bias
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COMPLEMENTARITY AS GENERATIVE
PRINCIPLE WITHIN A HISTORICAL
FRAME
“Nobody can clap with one hand only” is an old Chinese saying,
and these few words describing complementarity as a generative
principle express in a simple metaphor what we would like to
suggest as a thought pattern for aesthetic appreciations and for
cognitive appraisals or evaluations in general. This knowledge
reflecting common sense but sometimes remaining on an implicit
level can be extracted from many writings since ages in different
cultures. “Without an overview on details, there is no beauty, this
daughter of the whole and relation”. This is the free translation
of a sentence from “Vorschule der Ästhetik” (Pre-School of
Aesthetics) which some 200 years ago was published by Richter
(1813) in a well received book at that time. This concept of a
necessary complementarity with respect to beauty and aesthetic
appreciation has (to the best of our knowledge) never been
discussed explicitly within a scientific context, but it can be
extracted as an underlying thought pattern if one goes through
the history of philosophy and reasoning about the arts in different
cultures. It would be a misunderstanding, however, if one argues
that “harmony” or “good gestalt” has already been suggested
as an equivalent conceptual frame within this context (e.g.,
Eysenck, 1942; Kintsch, 2012); logically speaking, harmony or a
good gestalt may be the consequence of complementarity as a
generative principle, not the cause.
Apparently, Fechner (1860), the founder of psychophysics, has
copied the title “Vorschule der Ästhetik” (1876) from Jean Paul
(as he is known as a writer), but the concept of complementarity
as a creative principle was not taken up by him. Quite the
contrary, Fechner stressed the asymmetry between the whole (or
the gestalt) and the details giving rise to the whole. As he writes
(in free translation, page 46): “An aesthetics which does not want
to keep itself at a low level, focuses on the whole, and considers
the details only be themselves. . ..The whole goes beyond the
details”. As Fechner is considered to be not only the founder
of psychophysics, but also of “empirical aesthetics” (which for
some researchers is strongly associated with “neuroaesthetics”),
it is worth noting that a fundamental concept in this field of
scientific endeavor has not received the necessary attention;
in fact, it is even conceivable that the monocausal reasoning
which is typical for research in psychophysics has prevented
the broader view toward aesthetic appreciations. To prevent
any misunderstandings it should be noted that we refer to
“complementarity as a creative or generative principle”, and
not to a “descriptive principle” as it is done in theoretical
physics, in particular in quantum mechanics with respect to the
wave/particle dualism (Pöppel, 2006).
Complementarity as a creative or generative principle with
respect to the evaluation of beauty or human reasoning in general
as reflected in moral judgments is indeed nothing new. In the
Daodejing ascribed to Laozi (2009) one reads in the beginning
of the second chapter: “Everyone knows what beauty is, because
of the existence of ugliness. Everyone knows what goodness is,
because of the existence of badness”. Thus, what is beautiful and
what is good can only be understood because of ugliness and
badness. This principle of complementarity to understand beauty
corresponds conceptually in the traditional Chinese thinking to
the Yin-Yang principle which has maintained its importance as a
thought pattern since several thousands years.
The principle of complementarity as creative principle is
also a basic feature in the Western tradition; as the German
philosopher Cassirer (1923/2008) has shown for the dialogs
of Plato (1961), both “eidos” and “eidolon”, the idea and the
image have to come together in the arts to create consistency
or harmony (in German “Stimmigkeit”; it might be mentioned
in passing that a lot of philosophical and scientific literature
remains mute for the only English speaking community and,
thus, appears to be lost nowadays in scientific discourses). At a
later occasion, Cassirer (1942/2011) has analyzed the principle of
complementarity (without using this word) as a thought pattern
in Plato’s reasoning (in Theaitetos) when he refers for instance
to “thinking as a conversation of the mind with itself ”. It has to
be added that in Plato’s Symposion (211d) beauty as a concept is
related to love, indeed sexual desire, and life is only worthwhile
to live when we see what is beautiful, and what is indeed meant
is a beautiful body. In the Greek tradition, Plato was not even the
first to stress complementarity as a principle; it was Heraclitus
who said that we discover health because of disease, satisfaction
because of hunger; to be awake goes together with sleeping, to
be old with young, to be good with bad (as Laozi said), or to be
male with female. Unity is created by opposing elements in their
relations.
The relationship between thinking and speaking as formulated
already by Plato in his remark has remained a conceptual
challenge until modern times, and it has also been an issue in
literature. The German poet Heinrich von Kleist (1805/1806)
wrote some 200 years ago in an essay “on the gradual creation
of thoughts while talking” that talking to another person is a way
to clarify or even create one’s thoughts. The other person does
not have to be a specialist at all, and should not even comment
on what one is saying. The mere physical presence of another
human being is sufficient to trigger the thought processes and
may lead to a conclusion one could not reach alone. This would
be indeed a prime example of complementarity as a creative
principle. What the poet von Kleist suggested is very similar
to a concept developed by Vygotsky (1934/1987). His idea is
that thinking and speech are not completely separated, but they
are also not identical. Vygotsky maintains that speech does not
express thinking, but thinking develops in speaking, and thoughts
may change while speaking. It is further claimed in his theory
that inner speech developed from external speech via a gradual
process of “internalization”.
The relationship between language and thought in modern
times is also a central issue by Perlovsky with his many
publications and rich ideas (e.g., Perlovsky, 2014, 2015, 2016).
In a dual hierarchy model explaining the “physics of the
mind” which is meant to establish a new area of science,
the link between cognition and language is described. His
theoretical reasoning is based for instance on observations of
emotional effects and aesthetic appreciations, in particular in
music. Important references are made to evolutionary principles
like the “knowledge instinct”, and his theoretical concepts are
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formulated also in a mathematical language. Here are some
questions Perlovsky (2016) is asking, and also some answers are
given: “What is the difference between cognition and language?
How does cognition interact with language? Do we think with
words, or only use words as labels when a chunk of a thinking
process is complete? The science needs to understand the
mechanisms of language and cognition interactions; why are they
so independent, and so separate? Dualmodel is a fundamental
principle of the mind modeling interaction between language
and cognition. According to the dual model, every mental model
has a cognitive and language parts”. We would like to comment
that “language” in this model is treated in a very abstract way
not taking into account the different language competences like
the word lexica for content and function words, furthermore
the syntactic, semantic, phonetic, prosodic, temporal and in
particular also the pragmatic competence, i.e., employing speech
in a way that takes into account specific situations (Pöppel, 2006).
For a encompassing theory linking speaking and thinking (rather
than language and cognition) it appears to be reasonable to model
the link in particular on this detailed level.
The question of a functional link between thinking and
language is also relevant with respect to the differentiation
between explicit and implicit knowledge. Perhaps the most
famous definition of time comes from Augustinus et al.
(397/8/1993) in the eleventh book of his confessions where
he writes: “Quid enim est tempus? Si nemo ex me quaerat,
scio. Si quaerenti explicare velim, nescio” (What then is time?
When nobody asks me I know it. If I have to explain it to
somebody who has asked, I do not know). This is a prime
example of complementarity as a thought pattern because explicit
and implicit knowledge come together (Pöppel and Bao, 2011).
This thought pattern happens to apply for many theoretical
concepts in psychology which are difficult or impossible to define
exactly. If one asks “what is” consciousness or attention, one also
employs implicitly a complementary thought pattern. And the
same pattern applies to “beauty”. The difficulty to define should
not be, however, an excuse not to try the best to reach clarity
about what is meant on an explicit level following the first rule of
thinking as described by Descartes (1637/1990) in his “Discours
de la Méthode”.
If in these different cultures, in the ancient Asian and the
ancient Western cultures (which presumably did not influence
each other), complementarity as a thought pattern was well
established, it can be concluded that it reflects a basic human
trait in dealing successfully with the physical and the social
world. It shall not come as a surprise then that also in the
Arabic and Islamic culture the complementarity principle has
played an important role. One of the leading philosophers
in this culture has been Al-Farabi (who passed away in 950,
and who was characterized as the “second philosopher” after
Aristotle). Al-Farabi (2005) analyzed in detail for instance the
relationship between elements in thinking and their verbal
expressions to either create beauty or ugliness in a speech
(p.51). Al-Farabi was probably also the first in human history
to create in his book “De Scientiis” a taxonomy of functions
which deplorably still does not exist (Pöppel and Ruhnau,
2011).
A prime example for complementarity as a generative
principle, and on that basis providing a fundamental thought
pattern comes from the philosopher Immanuel Kant (1781/1787)
in his “Critique of Pure Reason” with his famous statement:
“Gedanken ohne Inhalt sind leer, Anschauungen ohne Begriffe
sind blind. Daher ist es ebenso notwendig, seine Begriffe
sinnlich zu machen, als seine Anschauungen verständlich zu
machen”. (Our translation: Thoughts without content are empty,
perceptions without notions are blind. Therefore it is equally
necessary to make one’s notions sensory as one’s perceptions
understandable).
Thus, the thought pattern of complementarity in different
cultures exists since ages, and this thought pattern has also been
related to aesthetic appreciations. Surprisingly, this principle
has not arrived in modern times, or it has been overlooked
in its relevance, in spite of the important work of Worringer
(1908/2007) on abstraction and empathy, or the thinking of
Kandinsky (1912/2009) when he talks in his book “On the
Spiritual in Art” (originally written in Russian and German)
about creating harmony in pieces of art; in fact, the entire
book of Kandinsky can be understood as an expression of
complementarity as a creative principle. One might argue that
such ideas are historically too far away and not being relevant
anymore. Or one might argue that employing “Occam’s razor”
to look for simplest explanations, complementarity as a thought
pattern is just too complicated. Both arguments (and possibly
others) are not really satisfying. One can extract the thought
pattern of complementarity as a creative principle in philosophy
and in art science also for more recent times or for modern art in
general, and many examples have been provided by Liessmann
(1999). As a perhaps not so recent example may serve the
Spanish philosopher Ortega y Gasset (1916/1957) who in an essay
analyzes the beauty of a lady who sits with him in a street car.
As he says within 3 s only, (which has been found to be an
important time window in cognitive processing: Pöppel, 2009a;
Pöppel and Bao, 2014; Wang et al., 2016) Ortega “knows” that the
lady is beautiful. In this first impression he is relying on implicit
or tacit knowledge (Pöppel and Bao, 2011). The point Ortega
makes is that although separate features of the lady’s face are
not beautiful or may not be beautiful, it is the relation between
the elements that create a gestalt, and which together in their
constellation create the beauty of the lady. This analysis is itself
an example of complementarity as the first impression based on
implicit knowledge is related to an analyzing process representing
explicit knowledge. Both knowledge systems interact and have to
come together, and as has been suggested previously (Pöppel and
Bao, 2011), they are unified both by the aesthetic and the mimetic
principle.
COMPLEMENTARITY AS GENERATIVE
PRINCIPLE IN NEURAL PROCESSING
The fact that complementarity has not been taken up in empirical
aesthetics is particularly surprising as basic features of cognitive
processing reflect this principle; many examples by Kelso and
Engstrom (2006), and so-called models (see below) refer to such
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processing. It is a truism that neural information processing
to create for instance visual representations is both bottom-
up and top-down. It is of course a challenge in research
to analyze the different processing aspects, but perception in
any modality cannot be understood only within the frame
of bottom-up and of top-down (e.g., Zhou et al., 2016).
Another example in cognitive processing is the complementarity
of content and logistical functions (Pöppel, 1989a); as the
words indicate, content refers to “what” is represented in
percepts, memories, emotions, or volitions, and logistical or
“how”-functions refer to the activation of neural systems as
reflected in circadian rhythms, attentional control with its
different neural implementations (e.g., Bao and Pöppel, 2007),
or temporal processing with its different time windows (e.g.,
Bao et al., 2015). Another example of complementarity refers
to anthropological universals and cultural specifics (Bao and
Pöppel, 2012); humans (and other higher level organisms) enter
the world with genetic programs of possibilities, and during
early phases of life specific programs are selected and imprinted,
and others are switched off on the basis of the environmental
conditions in the natural and cultural sphere. Thus, our value
systems and what might be appreciated as beautiful is necessarily
both, genetically determined and culturally imprinted. Another
important example for complementarity as generative principle
is the reafference principle (von Holst and Mittelstaedt, 1950);
for behavioral control an efference copy of a motor action has
to be balanced by the reafference after execution of the action;
only then does the organism obtain a signal that an action has
been completed successfully. This mechanism also shows that
activities are necessarily future oriented as the potential success
of an action is anticipated. Reward of behavior (Arias-Carrión
and Pöppel, 2007; Arias-Carrión et al., 2010) is embedded in
such reafference systems and is characteristic for any kind of
behavioral control, thus, including aesthetic appreciations.
Many more examples could be given, but only one
more shall be mentioned which is relevant in particular for
aesthetic appreciations, i.e., the complementarity of discrete and
continuous time. It has been shown with a number of different
experimental paradigms that temporal perception is discrete
on a presemantic level of processing (Pöppel, 2009a; Zhou
et al., 2012; Bao et al., 2016b). The brain creates discrete time
windows on different levels of processing, one being observed
for instance in the domain of approximately 3 s. This time
window has been proven to be important for poetry (Turner
and Pöppel, 1988) or for music (Pöppel, 1988, 1989b); both
verses and musical motives are preferably represented by artists
in a time window of approximately 3 s, (which should be
considered as an operating range and not a physical constant),
and violations of this temporal structure by speeding up or
slowing down too much verbal or musical representations result
in negative aesthetic appreciations. The time window of 3 s
which is pre-semantically provided by neural processes, and the
expression of a musical motive or the verse in a poem is, thus,
also an example of complementarity. Of course, other factors
play also an important role in the aesthetic appreciation of
music and poetry (e.g., Koelsch, 2014; Jacobs, 2015; Willems
and Jacobs, 2016). Although temporal processing is discrete
on a basic processing level, we still have the impression of
continuity of time. This feeling of continuity turns out to be
an illusion, although a necessary illusion (Pöppel and Bao,
2014); it is based on the semantic connection of what is
represented in segmented time windows which follow each
other, and it serves the purpose (in our view) to create and
maintain long-term identity for percepts, concepts and even
the self (Pöppel, 2010; Zaytseva et al., 2014; Zhou et al.,
2014).
When referring to the “self ” we would like to submit
the hypothesis that the maintenance of personal identity
across time using different time windows (Bao et al., 2015)
is based on a specific complementary mechanism which
involves the phenomenon of the doppelgänger (Pöppel,
2006). When analyzing one’s own episodic memory almost
everybody reports that he or she is pictorially present in the
images of the past. This is of course physically impossible;
if one sees something one is not represented in the picture.
Thus, images in episodic memory do not copy veridically
what has been visually experienced; the image of oneself is
projected at a later stage into episodic memory, presumably
for good psychological reasons. As a consequence when one
makes a time travel to the past one also meets one’s own
doppelgänger. The complementary mechanism with respect
to creation and maintenance of identity suggested is, thus,
that “I” am “I” because I am also my own doppelgänger.
The tragedy of a memory loss in certain forms of dementia
is also the loss of being oneself because the doppelgänger
is no longer available. It can be argued that a derivative
of this complementary principle can be seen in the desire
to obtain self-portraits or “selfies” (Carbon, 2017). To
own an external picture of oneself is not necessarily an
expression of overdone narcissism but an external means to
confirm of one’s own identity mimicking the doppelgänger
phenomenon.
Although there is strong evidence for the thought pattern
of complementarity within the historical context and as an
operating feature in neural processing, this concept has to the
best of our knowledge not been acknowledged appropriately
for aesthetic appreciations or in cognition in general. In
fact, a complementary view toward the behavioral and neural
level is sometimes even rejected. Palmer et al. (2013) argue
that with respect to “visual aesthetics and human preference”
the behavioral level comes first, and analyses of “beauty”
on the neural level have to use the behavioral level as an
orientation. This is not quite satisfying as the authors also
state that clear definitions of beauty are not possible (see
above) which makes it certainly not easy to orient oneself.
The difficulty to define “beauty” (in German “Schönheit”)
has already been spelled out by Fechner (1876): “A simple
indicator what makes things beautiful in a broad or narrow
sense does not exist; however, there are many attempts, to
describe the essence or the kernel of beauty from this or that
perspective by a simple phrase” (translation by the authors;
p. 10). But whatever “beauty” may be, according to Fechner
it is pleasure oriented, not too dissimilar from the view of
Plato.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 4 May 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 727
fpsyg-08-00727 May 6, 2017 Time: 15:44 # 5
Bao et al. Complementarity As Generative Principle
DIFFERENT PARADIGMS INSTEAD OF A
TAXONOMY OF FUNCTIONS:
CONSEQUENCES FOR MODELING
The greatest problem for empirical aesthetics, and for psychology
and brain science in general, is the lack of a taxonomy or
classification of functions. It may sound strange, if one says
about the own field of research that it misses the most important
feature of a science, but this is unfortunately true: We do not
have a taxonomy of those functions which we study. Biology
or chemistry became accepted sciences after such taxonomies
had been developed, but psychology does not have a generally
accepted classificatory system. Even worse: Most researchers are
not even aware of this fact. Instead of a taxonomy, we are
dealing with different conceptual frames or paradigms (Kuhn,
1962; Pöppel and Ruhnau, 2011) which dominate implicitly the
reasoning. We would like to remind ourselves of some such
paradigms.
The classical paradigm is oriented toward physics, and
psychophysics as it was developed some 150 years ago (Fechner,
1860) is still present and quite dominant in the rational
conjectures about an understanding of cognitive mechanisms
(Stevens, 1975). From a psychological point of view this
conceptual frame is based on a physical description of the world,
and the task of the researcher is to map the physical world
onto the world of subjective representations by defining objective
expressions of such relationships. Thus, one is dealing with
a physical and not with a psychological “taxonomy”. Another
conceptual frame is based on the assumption that cognitive
phenomena are directly mapped onto language. This paradigm is
deeply rooted in Western culture, mainly based on the thinking
of Descartes (1637/1990). Within this concept it is believed that
we can navigate through life only with explicit knowledge, and
this knowledge is veridically represented in language. That the
linguistic paradigm does not include the entirety of what makes
humans human, can be derived from an analysis of the different
knowledge systems (Pöppel and Bao, 2011). In addition to explicit
knowledge our mental apparatus is characterized by implicit
knowledge, which is fundamental for aesthetic appreciations; and
if one wants to follow Zeki (1999) in his argument (which we do)
one has to refer to sensory and visual representations in particular
as a third knowledge system. The linguistic paradigm represents
only a partial set of what goes on in the human mind and can,
thus, not be taken as a taxonomy of functions. A derivative
of the linguistic paradigm is a common sense paradigm based
on the unreflected use of language, and one can also refer in
this case to a “textbook paradigm”. Humans have apparently
a natural tendency to ontologize their mental environment
by the invention and uncritical use of words. Looking at
textbooks, the titles of the chapters imply a classification of
functions. One implication of these different entries is that
they represent independent mental phenomena like sensation,
perception, memory, emotion, attention, motivation, action,
intelligence, decision, or consciousness; all these terms show up
then in models developed for aesthetic appreciations. Fact is that
this textbook paradigm actually dominates the scientific activities
in psychology and neuroscience. We would like to indicate only
one overlooked problem of this unreflected paradigm, i.e., the
conceptual mistake to treat perception and attention on the same
categorical level; perception belongs to content function, while
attention belongs to the logistical function which provides an
operating basis for the creation of content; it is in our view
necessary to logically distinguish between content (the “what”)
and logistical functions (the “how”) in neural systems (Pöppel,
1989a; Bao and Pöppel, 2012).
And there are more such paradigms which have value within
their own frames of reference, and they have been useful
to gain some insight into psychological processes, like the
psychoanalytical paradigm (Freud, 1932/1961) or the ethological
paradigm (Lorenz, 1943), but again only a partial set of the
mental machinery is reflected within these paradigms, although
in both cases questions of aesthetics have been reflected. Finally,
one can mention the neuropsychological paradigm which indeed
is favored by ourselves. This paradigm refers to the unique
opportunity provided by observations with neurological or
psychiatric patients (e.g., Milner and Teuber, 1968; Luria, 1973).
The loss of functions in defined patient groups allows the creation
of a catalog of functions, and on that basis a reliable classification
or taxonomy of functions has already been developed in a
rudimentary form. The reasoning in this paradigm is that the loss
of a function proves its existence; only what exists can also be lost.
Obviously, from an epistemological point of view this paradigm
reflects a pragmatic monism in contrast to the classical dualism
(e.g., Descartes, 1637/1990) which in a disguised way can still be
detected in psychology and neuroscience, as well as in art science.
What are the consequences for empirical aesthetics or
neuroaesthetics that we do not own a taxonomy of functions?
The answer depends on the perspective one is taking. With a
pragmatic attitude one can argue that one does not care about
this conceptual deficit, and that one follows a line of research
within a preferred paradigm, be it on an explicit or implicit level.
Problems arise, however, if one develops models which are meant
to represent cognitive processes, in particular with respect to
aesthetic appreciations.
This raises the question of typical characteristics for models
which happens to be a controversial issue in spite of the important
analysis of models for instance by Jacobs and Grainger (1994)
within the special area of visual word recognition. We would like
to argue that models should be simple, exact, similar (to what
is modeled), and fruitful (allowing predictions). If the criteria of
being simple and exact cannot be fulfilled, the least one has to
demand is that models have to be similar to what is modeled
as has been pointed out for instance by Holland (2017) when
he refers to exploratory models in comparison to data-driven
models (as for weather prediction) and existence-proof models
which have also to be exact. However, if one looks at some
models as they are promoted in empirical aesthetics (e.g., Leder
et al., 2004, 2015; Leder and Nadal, 2014; Redies, 2015), they do
not match the necessary criterium of similarity. Suppes (1960,
p. 13) has been rather outspoken and may be overdoing the case
when he writes: “The attempt to characterize exactly models of
an empirical theory almost inevitably yields a more precise and
clearer understanding of the exact character of the theory. The
emptiness and shallowness of many classical theories in the social
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sciences is well brought out by the attempt to formulate in any
exact fashion what constitutes a model of the theory. The kind of
theory which mainly consists of insightful remarks and heuristic
slogans will not be amenable to this treatment. The effort to make
it exact will at the same time reveal the weakness of the theory”.
As there is no taxonomy of functions in psychology, the
models proposed violate the principle of similarity because it is
unclear to what they could be similar. The models proposed are
certainly not exact or simple. They refer to the repertoire of all
psychological functions one can imagine, and they are also not
specific to the arts or to aesthetic appreciations as one can replace
these terms by others like “fashion” or “design”. A particular
deficit is seen in temporal processing (Leder and Nadal, 2014)
as it remains unclear how different and sequential mental states
can follow each other; how is the end of one mental process
defined such that the next one can take over? One is left with
the impression of a hidden epistemological dualism. We are well
aware of our severe criticism, but in our view this problematic
issue has to be raised. What is proposed as “models” is much too
general, and it does not match the criteria which define scientific
models.
This critical position that one cannot talk about models in
neuroaesthetics is based also on another shortcoming; when
one attributes any psychological function to specific brain areas
or neural networks using fMRI, it is not known whether the
BOLD signals reflect excitation or inhibition. On the cellular
and intercellular level excitatory and inhibitory transmitters
determine neural processing. It is hard to believe that this basic
principle of information processing is lost on a modular level,
i.e., within circumscribed regions of the brain which are made
visible in their activities with imaging technologies. One can only
say that some areas participate (more or less) in certain tasks,
but the polarity is not known. Changes in activations can mean
very different things which are open to any kind of interpretation.
They may represent neural excitation within a network, but it
could also be inhibition; however, the neural participation could
also mean central fatigue, or alternatively increased effort to deal
with the complexity of neural processes. All these problems make
it difficult if not impossible at present to develop neural models
of aesthetic appreciations.
SOME RESULTS ON RESEARCH IN
VISUAL ART AND COGNITIVE
NEUROSCIENCE
Neuroscience and Psychology
Approaching Art
Given the problematic situation of empirical aesthetics as
outlined above we adopt, however, a pragmatic attitude and
summarize some research results having in mind that they are
rather preliminary with respect to complementarity as a thought
pattern, and also with respect to the lack of a taxonomy of
functions. It is hoped that in the future these observations
and many others that have been obtained may contribute to
the development of a taxonomy of functions, and that they
can be reflected within the concept of complementarity as a
creative or generative principle. The intersection of neuroscience
and art has been termed “neuroaesthetics” in recent years, the
broader perspective being empirical or experimental aesthetics.
While the term neuroaesthetics is rather recent, the scientific
approaches are not that new. For instance, in the early 1980s,
the Werner-Reimers-Foundation in Bad Homburg (Germany)
established a study group to investigate the “Biological Aspects
of Aesthetics” in a cross-disciplinary way. Results of this
study group have been published in “Beauty and the Brain”
documenting the power of interdisciplinary work (Rentschler
et al., 1988) with a strong bias toward the aesthetic theory of Kant
(1790).
According to Kandel and Mack (2003) there are two general
perspectives as to how neurosciences can approach the arts. The
first way is to investigate the “cognitive and perceptual analysis
of viewing a picture”, the second focuses on “the biology of
judgment, taste, aesthetic sensibility”. Thus, the first is interested
in the processes that occur in the brain when we look at a work
of art, and the second is interested in the (affective and cognitive)
responses in the viewer, i.e., in what it is that makes the viewing
of artworks a special perceptual experience. It remains, however,
rather enigmatic why these two different perspectives should
be treated independently; the point in this field of endeavor is
to relate the neural with the experiential domain, and harvest
in a bidirectional way insights as indicated for instance in the
neuropsychological paradigm (see above).
In a review, Chatterjee (2011a) gives a critical overview
on the nature of neuroaesthetic activities, and he sets an
agenda for further investigations to shift the way how questions
are asked and for continuous attempts at refining research
methodology and tools. Similarly to Kandel and Mack (2003),
Chatterjee proposes a differentiation between two branches
of how the neuroscience approaches the arts, i.e., parallelism
and experimental neuroaesthetics. While Kandel and Mack
differentiate the fields with regards to the questions that are
asked, Chatterjee’s distinction is mainly concerned with the
methodology that is used in each field of research. Parallelism
is the area of research that parallels artists’ creations with
functions of the brain; (Chatterjee, 2011b refers to this research
that it “drapes art and aesthetics with neuroscience”). There
are several scholars that promote the parallelist approach to
neuroscience and art, such as Livingstone (1988), looking at
the visual and perceptual processes involved in art experiences,
or Ramachandran and Hirstein (1999), who introduced a
“neurological theory of aesthetic experience”. Furthermore, the
researcher who is most commonly associated with the parallelist
approach is Zeki (1999); he is interested in studying the neural
basis of art, and he believes that art is an “extension of the brain”
as it employs the same functions and principles of the brain when
art is created and when it is perceived. Knowledge creation is what
Zeki assumes to be at the core of both the functioning of the brain
and that of art. Zeki views the artist as a “naïve” neuroscientist
who researches and uses his insights into visual processes and
properties in creating an artwork, instead of studying it in a lab;
however, his approach has also been criticized (e.g., Chatterjee,
2011a).
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The other line of research that Chatterjee (2011a)
differentiates is “experimental neuroaesthetics” which
approaches the arts with testable hypotheses to be investigated
using neuroscientific methods to further understand features of
the aesthetic experience on the sensational, emotional (such as
aesthetic emotion, pleasure, reward) and also on the semantic
level. Traditionally, there have been fewer attempts to bridge the
two disciplines from this angle and to approach art experience
from a hypothesis-based neuroscientific perspective. However,
this field has been rapidly growing in recent years and has
produced promising insights into what art is, and what the
crucial aspects of an art experience constitute. To date, several
reviews and meta-analysis have been published, attempting to
systemize and synthesize the insights that have been gained on
the psychological and brain basis of interacting with art (e.g.,
Solso, 2001; Jacobsen et al., 2006; Di Dio and Gallese, 2009;
Cela-Conde et al., 2011; Chatterjee, 2011a; Leder, 2013).
This approach corresponds partly to the one of our own
research environment (e.g., Pöppel et al., 2013a). We use art as
a potentially rich source of stimuli to obtain a better insight
into cognitive mechanisms. We argue that perceptual stimuli
from the arts like paintings, poetry or music allow a unique
access to higher cognition complementing other experimental
paradigms. We have given examples that demonstrate how useful
such an alternative and complementary approach can be. For
instance, how we perceive art depends on mental framing and
sensory priming (Graupmann et al., 2013; Silveira et al., 2014a,b).
Furthermore, a better understanding of personal and what is
referred to as “the self ” can be obtained by using artwork
(Pöppel, 2010; Zaytseva et al., 2014; Zhou et al., 2014; Bao et al.,
2016a). In addition, it could be demonstrated using surrealistic
and naturalistic paintings that the brain distinguishes effortlessly
between the physically possible and the impossible (Silveira et al.,
2012). This observation may superficially relate to the fluency
model (Reber et al., 2004) which is favored by many researchers
in empirical aesthetics. However, we prefer to relate these results
to the thought pattern of complementarity as it is shown that the
brain distinguishes effortlessly between alternatives; presumably,
for surrealistic art additional neural modules have to be switched
on, which are active below threshold when viewing naturalistic
pictures. This observation may relate to observations on aesthetic
and moral judgments; it has been suggested that they share
the same neural network, moral judgments coopting additional
neural modules like the precuneus, the posterior cingulate cortex
and the temporoparietal junction (Avram et al., 2013). It comes,
however, as a surprise that this observation of sharing neural
substrates should “substantiate the significance of symmetry and
complexity for our judgment of beauty” as Jacobsen et al. (2006)
suggest; it is difficult for us to follow this argument.
From our own research environment some additional
observation might be of interest. With respect to the aesthetic
appreciation of music it is suggested that personality factors
are important predictors for perceptual processing (Park et al.,
2013). Furthermore, individual imprinting is essential how we
experience art (Park et al., 2014, 2015); long-term musical
education makes us more sensitive to detect negative emotions
like sadness in music or speech. With a new experimental
paradigm using experiences stored in episodic memory (instead
of pre-fabricated stimulus scenarios) it could be shown that
retrospectively the beauty or ugliness of environments can be
evaluated (Vedder et al., 2015). The visual field representation
in the brain, in particular the hemispheric difference, has been
shown to be reflected in pictures (Stoerig et al., 1983); pictures
with a strong emotional appeal more often show their optical
center on the left side corresponding to right hemisphere in
neural processing. Different representations of visual perspectives
in Eastern and Western art indicate substantial intercultural
differences (Bao et al., 2016a); whereas the floating view in
Chinese or Japanese landscapes creates an internal point of view
(in German: “Ich-Nähe”), the central perspective in Western
landscapes leads to an external point of view (“Ich-Ferne”).
Within this context we argue that the central perspective does
not mimic veridically the way of seeing as has been implied by
some art scientists (e.g., Gombrich, 1982). The central perspective
which follows geometrical rules does not account for size
constancy, it does not appreciate distance effects as objects far
away have less clear contours, and it misrepresents the visual field
as its periphery extending up to 90 degrees visual angle along the
horizontal meridian is contracted in pictures to a much smaller
visual angle to be represented only in the perifoveal region. On a
theoretical level it has been argued that the aesthetic principle can
be used as a unifying concept of the different modes of knowledge
(Pöppel and Bao, 2011). A unifying principle of our endeavor is
to focus on anthropological universals and cultural or individual
specifics in the arts, and how they allow a deeper understanding
of cognitive mechanisms (Bao and Pöppel, 2012).
Taken together, neuroaesthetics in spite of all the criticism
that has to be spelled out is an inspiring growing body of research
that is exploring similarities between the functions of the brain
and the ways artists work, as well as studying neurocognitive
and neuroaffective correlates of aesthetic experiences. These
approaches implicate a growing transdisciplinary interest
neuroscientists and psychologists have in art and aesthetic
appreciations. The following sections of our short summary are
intended to illustrate the significance of neuroscience and its
methods to gain insights into questions of art theory beyond
neuroaesthetic parallelism. Most studies we mention focus on the
neural underpinnings of the sensational, emotional, or semantic
aspects of experiences with visual art.
NeuroImaging Studies on Art and
Non-art
One question that neuroimaging studies have been focusing on
with regard to understanding art is very basic: what is art?
How does the brain process art compared to non-art? What
makes art different from other images or objects and what is
the neural basis of viewing an original artwork compared to a
copy or to non-art? A number of brain imaging studies have
been conducted to investigate these questions to understand what
makes an artwork different from images or objects that are not
artistic creations. Most of these studies have compared images of
original works to either manipulated version or non-art images
or photographs. These studies yield insight for understanding
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what makes art special, what makes an experience with art
special.
Di Dio et al. (2011) used fMRI as a method and compared
the neural responses to images of classical male sculptures
with non-artistic photographs of human bodies in a group
of students that had no training in art or art history. When
participants were asked to observe the original sculptures their
neural responses yielded stronger activation in the antero-dorsal
portion of the right insula compared to when they were observing
the images of the human body. The authors argue that the original
sculptures may possess features that are associated with aesthetic
appreciation (golden ratio principle of canonical proportions)
stressing the involvement of the insula, and they interpret this
activation as a “hedonic signature of aesthetic experience”.
Similarly to this study, Lutz et al. (2013) conducted an fMRI
study to investigate the differences in neural responses to images
of body representations that are either visual artworks by artists
such as Rubens, Kirchner, or non-artistic photographs. The
authors report increased neural activation in the right parietal
cortex and in bilateral extrastriate cortex in response to the
artistic images. They interpret their findings as evidence that
viewing an artwork involves distinct patterns of neural activation
that may reflect processes such as visuo-spatial coding and also
motor mapping.
Kirk et al. (2009) have approached the study of neural
responses evoked by images that are labeled as art or non-art to
understand cognitive “top-down” influences. The authors used
fMRI to study how the neural responses of their participants
differ between images that were either labeled as works of art
from an art gallery or as generated by a computer. Participants
observed the images in the scanner and the authors found
stronger activation in the medial orbitofrontal cortex and
prefrontal cortex in the art gallery context compared to the
computer context. They suggest that their findings imply that
the semantic context (information about validity as an artwork)
modulates brain responses related to reward and thus crucially
influences the aesthetic experiences.
Mizokami et al. (2014) investigated whether there are distinct
neural underpinnings of viewing paintings, independently of
their motif or of an assessment of beauty. The authors conducted
an fMRI study and presented their participants’ images of
15 famous paintings and photographs of these 15 paintings.
The results of the study revealed increased activation in
bilateral cuneus and left lingual gyrus. The authors stress that
this finding implies distinct neural mechanisms for aesthetic
appreciation of representational paintings. A question that is
closely related to the problem of “art or non-art” is directed to the
artwork’s authenticity. A viewer’s experience and the respective
neural response seems to be directly impacted by the declared
authenticity of an artwork, whether it is a “real” work, or a fake
or imitation. Huang et al. (2011) and Parker (2014) conducted
an fMRI study that measured the brain activation patterns of
art experts in response to several Rembrandt paintings that were
either labeled to be authentic or to be a copy. In response to
the authentic paintings, the authors found increased activation in
orbitofrontal cortex and relate this response to the reward aspect
of the viewing experience of a genuine artwork. In response
to the artworks that were marked to be copies particularly the
fronto-polar cortex and further brain areas showed increases in
activation that may reflect a process of sequential thoughts.
Lacey et al. (2011) focused on a related question using
fMRI: the authors investigated how the artistic status of an
image influences the neural activation patterns when viewing the
images. In the scanner, participants observed images of drawings
and paintings from a variety of styles and of photographs
that were classified as non-art images. The authors found that
art images activated the ventral striatum, hypothalamus and
orbitofrontal cortex, regions of the brain that are related to
reward. The authors conclude that not the hedonic value but
the artistic status of an image drives the visual art experience
that the reward-related areas of the brain. Taken together, studies
dealing with the neural correlates of art compared to non-art
have stressed the reward value and emotional pleasure that an
engaging with authentic and genuine art evokes; the studies
mentioned above allude that brain areas related to specific
cognitive and most importantly reward processes are involved
when we engage with art, or with images that we take to be art.
Themes from Art History and Art Theory
Any definition of art in art theory and philosophy is closely
related to the identification of aspects that are crucial to a given
understanding of art and features that ought to be focused on
when interacting with or making statements about art. At present
there have been few cross or inter-disciplinary approaches that
have built on or have established theoretical connections between
brain sciences and positions from art history or art theory. While
John Onians (2008) “Neuroarthistory” is an example of blending
art history with insights form brain sciences, it is mainly focused
on the art historical context artists worked in and artworks were
created in. However, a growing number of experimental studies
from the field of neuroscience and psychology provide some
insight into specific aspects that have been proposed to constitute
art or are crucial for an understanding of art.
In the following section, we will point out aspects of some
prominent areas of interest in art history and art theory and
will elaborate ways neuroscientific investigations have provided
valuable insights into certain brain mechanisms that might
correlate with or underlie those ideas. A certain number of broad
categories that may be useful in categorizing theories of art have
been proposed and rely on broad terms such as presentation,
expression, or form (e.g., Berleant, 1969; Osborne, 1970; Carroll,
1999).
Representation
Theories of art that assume that art at its essence is an attempt
to depict reality and ought to reflect the real world can be
described as representation theories of art. Idealists such as
Plato for instance stress that art should replicate the ideal
found in nature: art should transcend to a higher level, work
as an ideal, and reflect non-humanly perfection in lacking
expression and emotion. Winckelmann (1755) formulated the
(possibly) first concise framework for art critique and history,
investigating and analyzing ancient Greek art as the ideal model
for art production. He proposed that beauty is in tension with
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expression and only few artworks achieve ideal beauty in that
they are free of emotions or sensations, and he assumes that
through “Nachahmung” (imitation) of nature idealization can be
achieved. But such imitation of nature proves to be complex,
as we need to define what kind of nature we are dealing with.
Winckelmann relies on a medieval interpretation of Aristoteles’
reflections on a “poietic nature”, which led to two different
ideas, i.e., “natura naturans” and “natura naturata” which is
again an example of complementarity. While the Greek ideal of
art as “naturing nature” in its essence and dynamic creativity
was influential until romanticism, the “natured nature”, its
domestication and objectification, is the guiding criterion of art
since the enlightenment and the triumph of reason.
A variety of studies from neuroscience and psychology have
investigated subjects related to the question of representation
or idealization in art. Related to the idealist stance that art
should reflect the true ideal of nature, the question of “an
ideal” representation compared to an altered representation was
investigated by Di Dio et al. (2007). The authors used images
of renaissance and classical sculptures that represent idealistic
properties of the human body and of modified versions of the
same sculptures to investigate differences in brain responses
of non-experts in art during their observation in an fMRI
experiment. The authors report that observation of original
sculptures led to activations in the lateral occipital areas, the
precuneus and prefrontal areas and in particular in the right
insula. The authors suggest that this activation is related to
processing of objective beauty that an original artwork possesses,
and that it is independent of a subjective aesthetic judgment.
Apart from the issue of an ideal representation of natural
forms in art, another branch of research has been focusing
on the questions of how the brain processes different artistic
representations, and if there is a difference in neural processing
between art works that depict a realistic image of a scene (“natura
naturata”) and the natural scene itself. Vogt and Magnussen
(2005) investigated hemispheric specialization for abstract and
object based images. The results of their study indicated the
two styles of images were processed with a different hemispheric
advantage, and that these differences were modulated by artistic
expertise.
Silveira et al. (2012) conducted an fMRI study and investigated
the differences in brain responses to works of art that were
either naturalistic or surrealistic (see above). Surrealistic and
naturalistic images matched with regard to psychophysical
parameters were presented to subjects with no background in the
arts. The authors found increases of activation in the visual cortex
and in the precuneus. The authors conclude that their findings
may reflect decreased processing fluency for surrealist paintings,
and increased self-referential processing in response to art works
that portray realistic representations.
There are several studies that have compared brain responses
to abstract vs. representational art. Cattaneo et al. (2014)
used transcranial magnetic stimulation and were able to
show that the left prefrontal cortex and the right posterior
parietal cortex was differently engaged during viewing abstract
and representational artworks and their activation depended
on individual preferences. In another study, Cattaneo et al.
(2015) used the same method to investigate the effects of
brain stimulation during viewing abstract and representational
painting, this time focusing on the role of the lateral occipital
area which is involved in object recognition. The authors found
that stimulation of the lateral occipital area during viewing of
paintings reduced the aesthetic evaluation of representational
paintings but not of abstract paintings. The authors conclude
in stressing the importance of the lateral occipital areas in
aesthetic appreciation of representational artworks due to the
neural processes that are involved in object recognition.
Lengger et al. (2007) used slow cortical potentials (SCPs) to
investigate differences in neural activation patterns in response
to modern and contemporary representational art by artists
such as Maria Lassnig, Peter Pongratz, Jean Michel Basquiat,
and abstract artworks by artists such as Mark Rothko, Gerhard
Richter, Yves Klein, and Jackson Pollock. Participants viewed
the artworks and made ratings for understanding and aesthetic
appeal. The authors found increased activation in response to
representational paintings in the left frontal lobe and bilaterally in
the temporal lobes and they suggest that these differences may be
due to the lack of recognizable objects in abstract art that impedes
the processing of abstract artworks.
Fairhall and Ishai (2008) studied the neural responses to
representational, indeterminate and abstract art using fMRI.
Indeterminate art represents a certain perceptual ambivalence
(e.g., Muth and Carbon, 2016) in which objects are suggested
but perceptually unseizable. The authors presented 12 subjects
with 52 indeterminate paintings by Robert Pepperel, and
52 representational and abstract paintings, respectively. The
authors found similar activation for all types of paintings
in the visual cortex and the intra-parietal sulcus, probably
reflecting processing of object form and challenging attentional
demands. Representational artworks elicited stronger activation
in the right fusiform gyrus, implying increased (top down)
processing of familiar objects (including faces). Also, compared
to indeterminate artworks, neural responses to representational
paintings increased activation in the tempo-parietal junction,
possibly reflecting processes of binding of form and spatial
information. On the other hand, indeterminate artworks
compared to the other types elicited the least activation in the
right hippocampus, which may reflect impeded encoding of these
artworks. The authors stress the involvement of a distributed
cortical network that is involved in and modulated by the
perception of different types of visual art. While neuroimaging
studies may of course not be able to determine the artistic value
of different types of representation in art, the studies reviewed
above do support a stance that assumes fundamental differences
in experiences with art influenced by ways of representation.
Although the studies referred to above (and many others
not mentioned in this selected overview) which are employing
modern experimental technologies appear to provide important
new insights, some remarks on methodological problems are
necessary. Transcranial magnetic stimulation is an interesting
new technique (e.g., Cattaneo et al., 2014, 2015), and it is
argued that it allows causal analyses of central information
processing, but such conclusions have to be treated with caution.
It might perhaps be concluded that the short-term interruption
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of neural activity in certain areas of the cortical mantle indicates
a participation for a specific subjective experience, but because
of the wide-spread blocking of neural activities which are
not focussed on neural modules, it is difficult to argue that
specific neural modules with their spatial characteristics are
involved. Furthermore, from a methodological point far-reaching
interpretations of results obtained with fMRI should also be
treated with caution as has already been indicated above. It
is unclear whether specific activation patterns represent an
excitatory or an inhibitory component of neural activities; it
could be simply neural participation of a large area which
could have rather different meanings like central fatigue, or
indeed perhaps on the psychological level more or less aesthetic
appreciation or any other cognitive appraisal. Another problem
with respect to investigate aesthetic appreciations are the typical
stimulus presentations in scanning experiments which certainly
do not reflect real life situations. Although such critical issues
from the methodological perspective have to be raised, it should
be stressed on the other hand that one cannot conclude that
such studies are without value. In this field of research it is often
the case that the results validate the methods. If one observes
differences in neural activations the methods chosen have been
proven to be useful otherwise one would not have obtained a
result. However, whether the observed differences reflect a test
of the hypotheses is a different issue. Indeed, the interpretations
of results obtained in studies with imaging technologies are
often rather far-reaching which include studies from our own
research environment (e.g., Silveira et al., 2012). However, this
does not allow the conclusion that the interpretations are wrong,
but one has to be cautious with respect to their psychological
implications.
Expression and Form
Another important aspect of art is its expressive potential.
This is not directly related to the triggering of emotion in the
perceiver but more specifically to the expression of the artist’s
own emotions and the potential induction of the same in the
beholder. Expression theories of art stress that the essence of art
is “. . . as an expression of any kind of conscious experience –
intellectual, emotional, or imaginative” (Khatchadourian, 1965),
i.e., to effectively illuminate the inner states of the artist through
a work of art. In fact, studies have shown, that viewers are
capable to perceive and also largely agree on the emotions that
are expressed in artworks. For instance, Blank et al. (1984) found
a high consistency in identification of emotions in artworks.
However, there are two ways the artist can express emotions
through the artwork, i.e., through content and through form.
How do formal attributes influence neural responses to
art? What different brain activation patterns are related to
compositions of lines, shapes, colors, and other formal properties
of an artwork? Representatives of formalism such as Bell (1914)
assume that at the core, art is “significant form” and good art
uses those formal elements to trigger an “aesthetic emotion”
in sensitive observers. “Anything which is art is an instance of
significant form; and anything which is not art has no such
form” (Weitz, 1956). There has been recently increased attention
on these topics in neuroscience (e.g., Chatterjee, 2003), but
studies that have investigated emotional perception related to
artworks, have mostly focused on the behavioral level. One study
that stands out was conducted by Melcher and Bacci (2013).
The authors pursued a truly interdisciplinary investigation
and studied the perception of emotion in abstract art from
a neuroscientific and art historian view. They report neural
activation in the interior frontal gyrus in response to artworks
that had been rated as highly emotional. The authors assume,
that perception of emotion in artworks possibly recruits similar
networks as those required for empathy processes. Furthermore,
the authors developed a set of stimuli consisting of emotional
abstract paintings that were pre-selected to express sadness and
happiness and used these in an emotional priming study. The
authors report that paintings were indeed successful as emotional
primes. In a second study, the authors investigated the emotions
subjects perceived in abstract paintings from visual cues such
as lines, shapes, colors, depth and composition; they found
that abstract artworks that were reported to express positive
emotions included bright colors, complementary color contrasts
and simple and regular shapes. The artworks that were rated to
express negative emotions involved dark colors, and irregular
shapes and forms. Furthermore, they were able to successfully
train a computer algorithm to predict emotional perception
ratings. The authors conclude, that there are indeed bottom-up
features in abstract paintings that determine the emotions that
viewers perceive in these artworks.
Embodiment and Simulated Motions
Related to the perception of emotion in artworks is the notion
of embodiment, the empathizing with the artist through his
creation. Freedberg and Gallese (2007) proposed that mirroring
and simulating mechanisms in the brain are crucial aspects of
emotional responses to art. The authors assume that viewers
automatically and internally simulate the emotional expressions
but also the movement represented or gestures implied in the
artwork. They suggest that the perceived movements in the
artwork evoke a feeling of bodily engagement in the observer
that is reflected by brain activation in mirroring areas as well as
emotional and motor related areas.
Battaglia et al. (2011) investigated the effects of movement
represented in a painting on the motor system in a transcranial
magnetic stimulation (TMS) study. The authors used
Michelangelo’s Expulsion From Paradise as stimuli and compared
the neural excitability in response to this painting, during
imagery of the painting and while viewing a photographic
reproduction of the painting. Also, they compared brain activity
to images that showed the same body part (right hand) at rest
and in a more emotional context. The results showed that
the representation of movement in the original Michelangelo
painting and during imagery led to increased cortical excitability
and specifically during imagery of the painting, intracortical
inhibition was reduced.
Umilta et al. (2012) also studied the relationship between
movement and cortical motor activation. Other than the former
study, they used abstract paintings that do not directly represent
a bodily movement but merely imply an action. Using EEG
the authors presented three high-resolution images of paintings
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by Lucio Fontana that show a varying number of cuts on a
canvas and three visually modified versions of the paintings on
a computer screen. The authors found that only the original
artworks elicited activation in the motor cortex but not the
modified versions, and the authors suggest that their findings
support the proposition of internal simulation processes that are
involved in the engagement with abstract visual art.
Sbriscia-Fioretti et al. (2013) further investigated this idea
and focused on hand gestures. They conducted an EEG
study with event related potentials and compared the cortical
activation during passive observation of abstract paintings that
included highly visible brushstrokes (visual indicators of hand
movements) by the artist Franz Kline to modified versions of
these paintings in which the “traces” of the artist movements were
smoothed out. The results showed that the original paintings
evoked stronger activation in the premotor and motor cortex
as well as orbitofrontal and prefrontal areas. They relate these
latter activations to reward related and cognitive processes and
stress. In concluding, the authors stress the crucial roles that
these activations together with the motor related activations play
for the experience art and they interpret their findings as strong
support for the proposition of embodied simulation of implied
movements specifically in the processing of abstract art. Taken
together, the studies referred to in this section lend support to the
notion that interacting with a work of art may indeed involve the
perception and identification of an (emotional) expression in a
work of art, and the perception of this expression can be related
to an embodied experience such as an internal simulation of the
motions perceived in the artwork.
Affective Aesthetic Experiences
Closely related to focusing on the expressive force of an
artwork is to approach art with an emphasis on the emotional
response an artwork can evoke in the observer and his or her
aesthetic experiences. The term “aesthetic” was first introduced
by Baumgarten (1750/1758/2007), and is derived from the
Greek “aisthesis” for “things perceived by the senses” instead
of “things known by the mind”. An aesthetic response goes,
however, beyond sensation and perception. Interacting with
an artwork also has effects on the affective dimension and
may lead to a strong emotional sensation. For instance, the
romanticists proposed that the most important aspect of art
is its capabilities to trigger strong affective responses in the
perceiver. There is, however, another aspect of the romantic
movement which supports our concept of complementarity as a
generative principle which is “romantic irony” (Schlegel, 1798–
1801/1988). Appreciating art has always the double aspect of
being emotionally involved and having at the same time an ironic
distance.
The essential function of art is seen in the expression of
emotion instead of reflecting reality as it is. Burke (1757)
introduced the concept of the sublime in aesthetics for
distinguishing the beautiful and the sublime within their own
categories, although we look at the beautiful and the sublime with
the complementary thought pattern. The beautiful, according to
Burke, is what is well-shaped, in proportion and aesthetically
pleasing, whereas the sublime is a powerful force inspiring awe,
and it has the potential to destroy us. Burke’s definition of the
power of the sublime proved influential for the aesthetics of the
Romantic era. For Burke (1757) in turn, beauty is a universal
concept and lies in the perceiver as he interacts with it; beauty is
regarded to be “ohne Interesse” (without interest). There is a large
and growing body of research using neuroimaging techniques to
study aspects of affective aesthetic experiences “with interest”,
i.e., the strong emotional responses to artworks. Vessel et al.
(2013) summarized aesthetic experience as a research topic as
follows: an “aesthetic experience involves more than preference,
encompassing a variety of emotional responses ranging from
beauty to awe, sublimity, and a variety of other (often knowledge-
based) emotions”.
It has been proposed that the experience of art is associated
with activity in a network of brain areas and that the pleasure
and positive feelings of an aesthetic experience rely on the
reward circuit, including cortical and subcortical regions such
as the orbitofrontal cortex and the ventromedial prefrontal
cortex (that are strongly related to reward processing and have
consistently been related to the assessment of beauty and aesthetic
appeal), the anterior cingulate cortex (that has been associated
with preferences and liking in different artistic domains and its
activation has been assumed to reflect the state of a person’s
subjective feeling), the insular cortex (that has been consistently
associated with self-referential processes and the experience of
emotions), and the nucleus accumbens (which is said to be
involved in the generation of positive affective experiences and
is assumed to play a role in the detection of the emotional
value of an artwork) (e.g., Cela-Conde et al., 2004; Kawabata
and Zeki, 2004; Vartanian and Goel, 2004; Jacobsen et al., 2006;
Cinzia and Vittorio, 2009; Ishizu and Zeki, 2011; Nadal, 2013).
Corroborating this view, Brown et al. (2011) conducted a meta-
analysis of 93 neuroimaging studies and concluded that aesthetic
experience crucially relies on an appraisal process of the affective
value of a work of art (or other aesthetic stimuli) that reflects
intero- and exteroceptive processing, and at its heart involves
the orbitofrontal cortex, the anterior insula, the rostral cigulate
cortex and the ventral basal ganglia. In line with this model,
Di Dio (2012) specified that particularly the activation of the
anterodorsal sector of the right insular might constitute the
core of the aesthetic experience reflecting the specific hedonic
response toward an aesthetically pleasing work of art.
Recently, Vessel et al. (2012, 2013) have proposed that certain
areas that are part of the default mode network (DMN) are
crucially involved in aesthetic experience, specifically in highly
intense emotional responses. In an fMRI study the authors found
that while activity in other regions such as the striatum varied
linearly with participants ratings of their subjective aesthetic
response (how strongly they were moved by the artwork),
specifically activity in the DMN increased stepwise only in
response to artworks that were rated highest. The authors
conclude that these activations reflect that aesthetic experiences
with highly moving artworks contain self-referential processes
that are strongly marked by subjective relevance of the works.
Cela-Conde et al. (2013) also investigated the involvement
of the DMN in aesthetic experience but used MEG
(magnetoencephalography) to study its temporal component.
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In three temporal windows and between two conditions,
the authors found two different networks to be involved in
aesthetic appreciation and thus propose a “twofold model of
aesthetic appreciation” that involves an “initial” network mainly
connecting occipital regions with links to the orbitofrontal cortex
and a “delayed” network that includes parts of the DMN. The
authors argue that this activation in stimulus dependent aesthetic
processing might be related to internal mind wandering.
Silvia (2005) notes that apart from pleasure, an aesthetic
experience with an artwork may also evoke other emotional
responses in the perceiver such as enjoyment, interest, and
distinct emotions such as sadness or joy. In this fashion, Silvia
and Brown (2007) and Silvia (2009) also investigated other
emotional responses during an aesthetic experience such as anger,
confusion, or disgust. While there is a large body of neuroimaging
studies on the perception and experience of emotions such as
happiness, fear, sadness, surprise, amazement in the context of
music (e.g., Juslin and Västfjäll, 2008; Zentner et al., 2008; Eerola
and Vuoskoski, 2013; Koelsch, 2014; Park et al., 2014, 2015), there
are as of now apparently (to the best of our knowledge) no such
studies that focus on visual art.
COMPLEMENTARITY IN INTERACTIONS
BETWEEN ARTISTS AND SCIENTISTS,
AND FUTURE CHALLENGES
In this summary above we focused on psychological and neural
aspects of visual art. In so doing we neglected relationships
between the different modes of art that have to be considered
as characteristic for visual art, music, poetry or dance. One
such fundamental link is their embeddedness in the temporal
domain. Although visual art is mostly considered as “spatial
art”, and music and poetry are “temporal arts”, this distinction
is rather superficial, and even wrong. Sensory processing is
always multimodal which is dictated by the neuro-anatomical
connectivity between different brain areas, and time windows
play an important role in all sensory domains as platforms
for sensation and perception (Bao et al., 2015) proving again
our concept of complementarity. One such time window has
a duration of approximately 3 s as indicated above which can
be observed in perception, movement control, sensorimotor
synchronization, working memory, or spontaneous speech
(Pöppel, 2009a; Pöppel and Bao, 2014), and this time window
is also basic for the appreciation of music (Pöppel, 1989b) or
poetry (Turner and Pöppel, 1988). It has been suggested (Pöppel
and von Stosch, 2014) that this time window provides also a
temporal frame for the appreciation of visual art like in cubism
or surrealism. Pictures for instance of Pablo Picasso, Paul Klee,
or Lyonel Feininger using ambiguous geometric figures like the
Necker cube create in the viewer temporal instabilities because
of spontaneous reversals; thus, one picture becomes in fact many
pictures in the mind of the viewer in an unpredictable way.
This underlying connection between spatial and temporal
processing in the arts appears to be an “unasked question”
(Pöppel et al., 2013b), as indeed several other unasked questions
can be identified in neurosciences or psychology. With respect
to temporal perception continuous processing is usually assumed
implicitly, in spite of the evidence of discrete processing as
demonstrated by time windows of different durations (Bao
et al., 2015). Another unasked question refers to the implicit
assumption of homogeneity of space, although it has been
demonstrated that visual space with respect to attentional control
is not at all homogeneous (Bao and Pöppel, 2007); in fact,
as one refers to “time windows” in sensory processing in the
temporal domain, one has to refer to “space windows” in the
spatial domain; within the perifoveal region sensory information
is processed differently compared to the periphery of the visual
field, and this “eccentricity effect” has been documented by
a number of studies (e.g., Bao et al., 2013a,b). As has been
indicated above with respect to the “central perspective” in
Western art, the space windows are also important for aesthetic
appreciations; in typical pictures of Western landscapes the
different space windows are loosing their perceptual saliency
which is characteristic for human vision. We would like to submit
that the intrinsic relationship between time windows and space
windows in their complementarity opens new opportunities for
research in visual art.
Our analysis and description of results certainly suffers from
several deficiencies, but one deficiency is usually not addressed
by others which is the strong language bias. This text is written in
English and most references cited have been written in English
with a few exceptions of original contributions in Chinese,
German, Greek, Latin, Russian, or Spanish. It is usually implied,
again reflecting an unasked question, that languages are neutral
with respect to the content to be expressed. If one has to write
in a foreign language one realizes that the language is not
neutral at all with respect to what one wants to say; certain
terms are extremely difficult or impossible to translate into
another language like for instance the temporal marker “present”
which in its Chinese and German “translations” evoke rather
different connotations (Zhou et al., 2014). Does the English
word “beauty” actually define subjectively the same frame of
reference as “Schönheit” in German? How does one translate
the German “ästhetische Empfindungen” (Liessmann, 2009) into
English? “Aesthetic sensibilities” as one might consider is not
quite convincing; the German term has a more active, the
English term a more passive flavor. Liessmann defines some
important areas for empirical research when he refers to aesthetic
appreciations not only within the context of “beauty”, but also
boredom; but then again major language problems arise when
he refers to “Anmut” (suggestions for English translations are
“charm, grace, agreeableness,.”.), or “Rührung” (the suggested
translation “emotion” misses completely the point). The famous
dissertation of Worringer (1908/2007) has the title in German
“Abstraktion und Einfühlung”, and the German “Einfühlung” is
translated as “empathy” which for somebody with German as a
mother tongue also misses the point. We raise this critical issue
here only with respect to two languages; it applies of course to all
languages which have to be mapped for communication purposes
onto the dominant language in use.
But this is only one aspect of the language bias, i.e., being
caught in different frames of connotations because of one’s
mother tongue. The other bias is equally serious; we as authors,
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(and this applies to anybody working in this field), have neglected
publications which have been written in languages we could not
read; who would claim that there is not important information
available on our topic written in French, Italian, Russian, Turkish,
Japanese, or else, and which is not available in translations we can
read, in spite of the deficiencies of translated texts? There is no
hope that these language biases can be overcome.
But is there indeed no hope? It will not be found in rational
conjectures within the conceptual jail of one language. In spite of
all the critical points we have raised there is at least one trajectory
that we pursue ourselves, and which we share presumably
with many researchers in empirical aesthetics, and this is the
complementary interactions between artists and scientists. On
this personal level, complementarity as a creative or generative
principle gets practical meaning. On this level of individual
interactions scientists learn from artists, and artists learn from
scientists; scientists are open to what artists are doing, and artists
are curious about basic research. As it happens, the product
of such creative co-operations is not necessarily represented in
scientific publications, but rather in contributions of catalogs
of the artists. In our own research environment the principle
of this kind of complementarity came to life in poetry (Turner
and Pöppel, 1988), in music with the musician Herbert von
Karajan (Pöppel, 1988), in visual art with the Russian/German
artist Igor Sacharow-Ross (Pöppel and Ruhnau, 2006; Pöppel,
2009b), or in installations with the Icelandic/Danish artist Olafur
Eliasson (Pöppel, 2011). At present we are looking for neural
correlates of aesthetic appreciations in the work of the Chinese
artist LaoZhu who represents the “third abstraction” (Bao et al.,
2017). According to some art historians the work of Malevich,
Kandinsky, or Mondrian represents the first abstraction, the
cubism of Picasso and the abstract expressionism of Pollock
stands for the second abstraction. Whereas the first and the
second abstraction focus on shapes and colors with meaning or
being meaningless, the third abstraction emphasizes the internal
point of view, and it is focused on emotional appreciations
which can already be seen in the work of Malevich. In the third
abstraction pictures create a feeling of belongingness, and, thus,
they stabilize personal and cultural identity. It is on this personal
level of complementarity where we get personal satisfaction and
reward, and where new ideas are born in an unpredictable way
which then can be investigated within an empirical context.
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